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I. INTRODUCTION
The realm of science has contributed greatly to the law. Courts
have long recognized that the specialized knowledge base of the scien-
tific community is a valuable source of information and, consequently,
often admit scientific evidence and testimony in court proceedings.
Because a court's decision to admit or exclude scientific evidence
can be outcome determinative, courts must make well-reasoned and just
decisions regarding the admissibility of this evidence. Admitting unreli-
able, unproven data can be as prejudicial as excluding sound evidence
that is merely unfamiliar to the courts and society in general. Distin-
guishing between sound and unreliable evidence is especially problem-
atic given the rapid developments in scientific knowledge and the
possible appearance to those not educated in the area that scientific
results are infallible. To keep pace with such a progressive area, the
courts must be dynamic in their approach and accept new developments
in these specialized areas.
The principles of relevancy and the standards governing all expert
testimony contained in the Federal Rules of Evidence apply to the
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admissibility of scientific information as well.' But courts have applied
special rules when determining the admissibility of scientific informa-
tion.2 Various standards have been suggested and applied by the courts
throughout the years, but no standard has enjoyed the longevity of that
espoused in Frye v. United States:3 to be admissible as evidence, a sci-
entific technique must have gained general acceptance in the scientific
community.
The Frye rule has been applied by most courts but has been limited,
modified, and rejected by others. Some courts have stated their support
for the Frye rule but have then allowed evidence that failed the Frye test
to be admitted on the ground that general acceptance of the techniques
goes to weight, not admissibility.5 Other courts have applied the Frye
rule only to "the underlying principles or methodology rather than the
particular studies or results based on those principles or that methodol-
ogy."6 Still other courts have equated the Frye rule with the require-
ments of showing the technique is valid, accurate, and reliable,7 ignored
the Frye rule,8 or rejected it and applied the traditional principles of
relevancy and helpfulness to the trier of fact.9
Argument surrounding the need for a new standard for admitting
scientific evidence focuses on two areas. The first area of concern is
that the Frye rule is too restrictive and conservative and fails to readily
adapt to and acknowledge new developments in scientific knowledge.10
This results in courts excluding relevant evidence until enough time has
passed for the newly-developed technique to be generally accepted by
the scientific community. Those who have their day in court in the
meantime suffer the consequences of having their evidence excluded.
The second area of concern is the courts' frequent willingness to
admit "scientific" evidence that is unproven, unreliable, or irrelevant to
support a given proposition."' Critics fear that this "junk science" is
1. FED. R. EVID. 702.
2. See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, A Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1203 (1980).
3. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
4. Scientific evidence must also satisfy the traditional elements of relevancy and helpfulness
to the trier of fact. See infra note 9.
5. See, e.g., State v. Olivas, 267 P.2d 893, 894 (Ariz. 1954); People v. Marx, 126 Cal. Rptr.
350, 355 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975); Jenkins v. State, 274 S.E.2d 618, 619 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980);
Commonwealth v. Cifizzari, 492 N.E.2d 357, 364 (Mass. 1986).
6. United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978).
7. CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203, at 872 n.30 (John W. Strong
ed., 4th ed. 1992).
8. Id. § 203, at 871.
9. Id. § 203, at 872 n.31; United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1226 (3d Cir. 1985).
10. See Giannelli, supra note 2, at 1223.
11. Id. at 1224-25.
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given too much weight by juries, who lack the foundation to question
the methodology, results, or applications of experiments or the expertise
of testifying witnesses who the court has presented as "experts."
' 12
Addressing both of these concerns in one standard is difficult
because they fall at opposite ends of the spectrum: one argues that Frye
is too restrictive and the other argues that the courts are too lenient in
admitting evidence. Basically, the goal is to readily admit relevant, reli-
able scientific evidence immediately after its initial development, while
insuring that unreliable, unproven "junk" science is excluded. Balanc-
ing these conflicting demands is not a simple task because opinions dif-
fer regarding what evidence fits into each of these categories.
In June 1993, the United States Supreme Court put some of the
debate to rest in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.13 The
Court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded the Frye
rule. 4 The opinion, however, does permit the Frye standard of "general
acceptance" to have some bearing on the inquiry into the admissibility
of scientific evidence. 5 The Daubert decision did not provide a new
rigid standard of admissibility but left much discretion in the hands of
the trial judge. 6 Thus, new problems will emerge in future cases in
defining the boundaries of that discretion.
This Comment discusses the special problems encountered in deter-
mining the admissibility of scientific evidence, the evolution of the Frye
admissibility standard, its strengths and problems, the merits and draw-
backs of other suggested admissibility standards, and the impact of the
Daubert case on the ongoing debate.
II. FRYE V. UNITED STA TES
A. Outline of the Frye Decision
Frye v. United States 7 has been the dominant rule for admissibility
of scientific evidence since its decision in 1923 by the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia.' The Frye rule requires that for
the results of a scientific test to be admissible, the test "must be suffi-
ciently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs."' 9
12. See Giannelli, supra note 2.
13. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
14. Id. at 2794.
15. Id. at 2797.
16. Id. at 2799.
17. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
18. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 203, at 868-73; Giannelli, supra note 9, at 1200.
19. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
19931
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In Frye, counsel for the defendant attempted to have an expert tes-
tify to the results of the systolic blood pressure deception test2° that he
had administered to the defendant prior to trial.2' The test operates on
the theory that lying requires conscious effort, which can be observed as
a rise in blood pressure.22 The government's counsel objected to the
testimony, and the trial court sustained this objection.23 Defense coun-
sel's subsequent request to have the expert witness conduct the test in
the presence of the jury was also denied.24
The court recognized that a problem existed in determining exactly
"when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages."' 25 The court reasoned that the
evidentiary value of the principle must be recognized somewhere
between these two stages, and "while courts will go a long way in admit-
ting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific princi-
ple or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particu-
lar field in which it belongs. ' '26 The court, affirming the lower court,
held that the systolic blood pressure deception test had not yet gained
sufficient standing and scientific recognition to justify admitting expert
testimony with respect to it.
27
The Frye rule requires courts to determine the status of the scien-
tific principle in the relevant scientific community, the validity of the
technique applying the principle, and the application of the technique
under the specific circumstances involved.28 General acceptance can be
shown "by surveying scientific publications, judicial decisions, or practi-
20. The systolic blood pressure deception test was a form of "lie-detector" test used before
the polygraph test was developed.




Defense counsel outlined the basis of its argument that the testimony should be admissible as
follows:
The rule is that the opinions of experts or skilled witnesses are admissible in
evidence in those cases in which the matter of inquiry is such that inexperienced
persons are unlikely to prove capable of forming a correct judgment upon it, for the
reason that the subject-matter so far partakes of a science, art, or trade as to require a
previous habit or experience or study in it, in order to acquire a knowledge of it.
When the question involved does not lie within the range of common experience or
common knowledge, but requires special experience or special knowledge, then the
opinions of witnesses skilled in that particular science, art, or trade to which the




28. Giannelli, supra note 2, at 120.
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cal applications, or by presenting testimony from scientists as to the atti-
tudes of their fellow scientists." 9
B. Practical Problems with the Frye Rule
The Frye rule has endured despite strong criticism about its restric-
tive nature. Professor Paul C. Giannelli has identified many of the diffi-
culties that occur in applying the Frye test.3°
Rigid application of the Frye rule requires a court to await the pas-
sage of time until a new technique develops to the point that it becomes
generally accepted. 31 Giannelli argues that this waiting period causes a
"cultural lag" while the technique is being developed, and the lag results
in reliable evidence being excluded during the interim.32
In addition, vague terms used in the rule, such as "scientific com-
munity" and "general acceptance," have enabled courts to define the
terms to suit their purposes in particular situations. 33 For example, when
a court wants to admit evidence, it is free to define the scientific commu-
nity narrowly to include only those experts who employ the scientific
technique in question.34  The term "general acceptance" has been
defined as everything from "widespread; prevalent; extensive though not
universal ' 35 to agreement by a "substantial section of the scientific
community."36
Professor Giannelli also raises the possibility that, under the Frye
rule, courts may admit the results of a scientific technique merely
because it meets the requirement of general acceptance, even if it is
unreliable or inaccurate. 37 Frye operates under the assumption that the
29. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 203, at 870; see, e.g., State v. Superior Court, 718 P.2d 171,
180 (Ariz. 1986); Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81 (Del. 1989); Commonwealth v. Mendes, 547
N.E.2d 35, 39 (Mass. 1989); People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 995 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
The Frye rule has been applied to testimony or evidence in numerous areas including
"[p]olygraph, graphology, hypnotic and drug induced testimony, voice stress analysis, voice
spectrograms, ion microprobe mass spectroscopy, infrared sensing of aircraft, retesting of breath
samples for alcohol content, psychological profiles of battered women, and child abusers, post
traumatic stress disorder as indicating rape, astronomical calculations, and blood group typing."
MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 203, at 869-70.
30. Giannelli, supra note 2.
31. Id. at 1223.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1208-28.
34. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 331 P.2d 251, 253-54 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1958)
(ruling that the Frye rule was satisfied by general acceptance of the Nalline test for narcotics use
by those physicians involved in drug treatment, despite the prosecution's concession that the
technique was not generally accepted in the medical profession as a whole).
35. United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685, 688 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 475 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
36. United States v. Williams, 443 F. Supp. 269, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
37. Giannelli, supra note 2, at 1224-26.
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scientific community will extensively test new scientific techniques
before applying them-an assumption that will not always hold true.
While acknowledging Frye's shortcomings, many courts continue
to apply the rule for lack of a superior standard. Perhaps this is because
a rigid standard may be best suited to protect the rights of criminal
defendants and to prevent requiring them to defend themselves against
unreliable evidence that carries undue authority and believability.3 8 This
argument fails, however, where it is the defendant who wants to intro-
duce novel scientific techniques as exculpatory evidence and the Frye
rule denies admissibility. In these circumstances, an issue may arise as
to whether the defendant is being denied the ability to present a defense,
especially if the reason for denying the admission of the defendant's
evidence is merely because the scientific technique has not yet achieved
general acceptance in the scientific community even if the evidence is
not considered unreliable for any other reason.
III. FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 702
A. Generally
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not distinguish between the
admissibility standards for scientific information and those for other
expert testimony.39 Rule 702 requires that a two-part test be met before
expert testimony is admissible.4" First, the court must determine
whether the witness possesses the "knowledge, skill, experience, train-
ing, or education"'" in the relevant field. Second, the court must decide
Giannelli points to several other problems in applying the Frye rule including:
the selectivity among courts in determining whether evidence derives from "novel"
principles; the inadequacy of expert testimony on many scientific issues; an
uncritical acceptance of prior judicial, rather than scientific, opinion as a basis for
finding "general acceptance"; and the narrow scope of review by which some
appellate courts review trial court rulings.
United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1236 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing Giannelli, supra note 2, at
1208-21).
38. A courtroom is not a research laboratory. The fate of a defendant in a criminal
prosecution should not hang on his ability to successfully rebut scientific evidence
which bears an "aura of special reliability and trustworthiness," although, in reality
the witness is testifying on the basis of an unproved hypothesis in an isolated
experiment which has yet to gain general acceptance in its field.
United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir. 1977).
39. Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Testimony by Experts, reads: "If scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EvID.
702.
40. Coleman v. Parkline Corp., 844 F.2d 863, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
41. Id.
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that the testimony offered by the expert will assist the trier of fact.42
Rule 104(a) is the standard used to make these decisions.43 Rule 703,
Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts, allows an expert to base her
opinion or inference on facts or data not otherwise admissible in evi-
dence, if they are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field." The standard of reasonable reliance is a different
threshold than that of general acceptance required by Frye.
The evidence rules appear to support a relevancy approach to the
admissibility of scientific evidence.45 The requirement that evidence
must assist the trier of fact illustrates a liberal approach to admissibil-
ity.46 But Rule 403 still can be used to exclude expert testimony if its
probative value is outweighed by the likelihood that its admission would
cause undue prejudice.47 This determination is made pursuant to the
trial court's broad discretion under Rule 104.48
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not directly provide for Frye or
any other test. But some support for this approach can be shown by the
wording of Rule 702. The terms "scientific, technical or other special-
ized knowledge" may imply by definition that the evidence be reliable.
The terms may also lend support for the Frye rule if they are read to
imply that scientific knowledge, for example, refers to the overall
knowledge of the field of science (that is, generally accepted ideas). If
the Federal Rules of Evidence were intended to provide for Frye or a
different admissibility test, they should be amended to support it clearly.
B. Proposed Amendments to Rule 702
In August 1991, proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence were published.49 The preliminary draft contained the following
proposed amended version of Rule 702:
Testimony providing scientific, technical, or other specialized infor-
42. Id.
43. Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the
existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the
court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In making its determination it is
not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.
FED. R. EviD. 104(a).
44. FED. R. EvID. 703.
45. Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 846 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988) (the Florida Evidence Code is
based on the Federal Rules).
46. Id.
47. United States v. Schmidt, 711 F.2d 595, 599 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 716 F.2d 901 (5th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1041 (1984).
48. See supra note 43.
49. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF-
CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE (August 1991).
1993]
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mation, in the form of an opinion or otherwise, may be permitted
only if (1) the information is reasonably reliable and will substan-
tially assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue, and (2) the witness is qualified as an expert by knowl-
edge, skill, experience, training, or education to provide such testi-
mony. Except with leave of court for good cause shown, the witness
shall not testify on direct examination in any civil action to any opin-
ion or inference, or reason or basis therefor, that has not been season-
ably disclosed as required by Rules 26(a)(2) and 26(e)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
5 0
Although the Standing Committee eventually withdrew it, proposed
Rule 702 was intended to "limit the use, but increase the utility and
reliability" of scientific opinion testimony.5' The amendments included
requirements that expert testimony be "reasonably reliable" and "sub-
stantially assist" the trier of fact.52 Rule 104(a) is used to determine
whether the testimony is reasonably reliable, whether it will substan-
tially assist the trier of fact, and whether the expert is sufficiently quali-
fied to render the opinion. 3
Unfortunately, the term "reasonably reliable" is one subject to a
multitude of interpretations and, as such, does not clarify the admissibil-
ity standard for scientific evidence. Even while consciously trying to
escape Frye's influence, the Committee ultimately defined "reasonably
reliable" by deferring to the opinions of the expert community: the
Committee notes specify that the revision is not a return to the Frye rule,
and then oddly state that "the court is called upon to reject testimony
that is based upon premises lacking any significant support and accept-
ance within the scientific community, or that otherwise would be only
marginally helpful to the fact-finder.
514
Regardless of the Committee's desire to depart from Frye, requir-
ing a degree of acceptance within the scientific community is a variation
of the Frye rule. Perhaps the standard is more relaxed than Frye's "gen-
eral acceptance" requirement, but this definition still requires that the
court define the relevant scientific community and determine the scien-
tific technique or principle's acceptance level in that community. Reli-
ance on the expert community's wealth of knowledge may be inevitable.
But this reliance also means that many of the concerns regarding Frye's
shortcomings are not answered by the proposed amendments.
The goal of the proposed amendments was to curtail the use of
50. Id. at 83.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 84.
53. Id.
54. Id. (emphasis added).
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expensive expert testimony with low marginal utility. 5" In civil cases,
proposed Rule 702 would have required that the court limit the use of
expert testimony before trial by balancing the "utility of the testimony
against the time and expense involved. 56 These proposed amendments
were an attempt to combat the perceived overuse of expert testimony in
the courtroom-the "battle of the experts"-where each side produces
an expert to testify in direct contradiction to the expert for the opposing
party on every conceivable topic, whether necessary for the jury's
understanding of the case or not. The Committee's task was difficult
because the dual goals of reducing the use of expert testimony and eas-
ing the restrictive nature of the Frye rule are not easily reconciled.
IV. OTHER ADMISSIBILITY STANDARDS
A. United States v. Downing
In United States v. Downing,57 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit rejected the Frye rule as "an independent control-
ling standard of admissibility. '58 The court held that the degree of
acceptance of a particular scientific technique in the professional com-
munity is merely one factor the trial judge should consider in determin-
ing the admissibility of scientific evidence, but that it is not a necessary
or sufficient condition to grant admissibility. 59
In Downing, the court held that the district court erred in refusing to
admit the testimony of a psychologist offered by a criminal defendant
regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification. 6° The court stated
that the admission of this type of expert testimony "is not automatic but
conditional. First, the evidence must survive preliminary scrutiny in the
course of an in limine proceeding conducted by the district judge ....
The appeals court derived this requirement from the helpfulness stan-
dard of Rule 702.62 During the in limine proceeding, the judge is to
balance two factors in making her determination: 1) the reliability of the
scientific principles upon which the expert testimony is based; and 2) the
likelihood that the admission of the testimony will mislead or over-
whelm the jury.63
55. Id. at 83, 84.
56. Id. at 84.
57. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
58. Id. at 1237.
59. Id.
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Second, admission depends upon the "fit," 64 that is, the direct
applicability of the offered evidence to the specifics of the case at hand.
The judge determines whether the "fit" of a particular piece of evidence
is adequate by considering counsel's specific proffer showing that scien-
tific research has established that particular features of the evidence
involved support the inference for which the evidence is being offered.65
The court also held that reliability should be the determining factor
in the decision to admit evidence.66 This approach is more flexible than
the Frye rule because the court is not forced to wait until a scientific
technique is sufficiently established before it is admissible.67 In the case
of novel scientific techniques with no proven "track record," a court may
"look to other factors that may bear on the reliability of the evidence.
68
These factors include the qualifications and professional stature of
expert witnesses, non-judicial uses of the scientific technique, the tech-
nique's relationship to more established modes of scientific analysis, and
the existence of specialized literature dealing with the technique.69
The factors identified by the court were to guide the district court
judge in his or her ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony under
Rule 702.70 The court, however, did not provide concrete guidance
regarding exactly how reliable evidence must be to be admissible and
how exact a "fit" is required. Other courts that attempt to follow Down-
ing likely will reach varied conclusions.
In reaching its decision, the court analyzed the different positions
that courts have taken in dealing with the admission of novel scientific
evidence. 71 The court indicated that many courts follow Frye in requir-
ing the underlying scientific technique to be generally accepted in the
relevant scientific community.72 Other courts have sought to vary the
Frye rule slightly to that of "reasonable scientific acceptance" or accept-
ance when the test's "accuracy and reliability have become established
and recognized."' 7" Another group of courts has argued that the Federal
Rules of Evidence require a generalized relevancy approach similar to
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1238.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1238-39.
70. The court further held that the district court's decision is reviewable under an abuse of
discretion standard and that the district judge still retains discretionary authority to exclude the
evidence under Rule 403 on the grounds that it would waste time or cause undue confusion. Id. at
1243.
71. Id. at 1232-33.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1233.
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the balancing test of Rule 403.74
The court agreed with Professor Giannelli's position that adherence
to Frye requires a court to make a preliminary determination regarding
the status of the underlying scientific principle in the relevant scientific
community, the validity of the technique employed to apply the princi-
ple, and the application of the technique in the particular circumstances
in question.7 5 Once the scientific technique has gained sufficient accept-
ance over a period of time, the court can proceed without the prelimi-
nary determination regarding the status of the scientific technique.76
B. McCormick Test
Professor McCormick would judge the admission of scientific evi-
dence by the "traditional standards of relevancy and the need for exper-
tise-and nothing more."77 This method can be referred to as 401/403
balancing because, in effect, it merely applies Rule 401, Definition of
Relevant Evidence, and Rule 403, Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on
Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time. In applying these
rules, a court must determine, first, that the evidence is relevant 78 and,
second, whether it should nonetheless be excluded on the specific
grounds identified in Rule 403. 79
The McCormick view rejects the general acceptance standard as an
unsuitable criterion for admissibility of evidence." General acceptance
by the scientific community would support the court taking judicial
notice of scientific facts but is too rigid a threshold to be used to exclude
evidence from the jury's consideration.8 ' Relevant conclusions sup-
ported by a qualified expert witness should be admissible unless a clear
reason for exclusion exists, such as prejudicing or misleading the jury or
consuming excessive time.
8 2
McCormick's test is advantageous because it avoids the Frye rule's
awkward determinations of exactly when a scientific technique has
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1234. See Giannelli, supra note 2, at 1201.
76. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1234.
77. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 203, at 873-74.
78. With respect to scientific evidence, the relevance requirement appears to imply that the
evidence must have scientific validity. See Brief for a group of American Law Professors as
Amicus Curiae at 11-13, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993)
(No. 92-102).
79. See id. at 13-14. Rule 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence."
80. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 203, at 874-75.
81. Id.
82. Id. § 203, at 875.
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become "generally accepted," how widespread the acceptance must be,
what exactly must be generally accepted (the underlying principles or
the technique itself), and to which "particular field" the technique
belongs.83 The McCormick test is more liberal than Frye because it
does not require any particular level of consensus of scientific opinion
before a particular scientific technique is admissible.84 But the degree of
consensus within the scientific community regarding the scientific tech-
nique or its application can still be used as one indicator of the scientific
value of the evidence.85 Professor McCormick believed that "the tradi-
tional balancing method focuses the court's attention where it belongs-
on the actual usefulness of the evidence in light of the full record devel-
oped on the power of the scientific test. 816 Further, unlike Frye and
other standards, McCormick's view considers the possibility for undue
prejudice and excessive expense involved with the admission of the sci-
entific evidence and requires balancing this with the probative value of
the technique.87
Some have deemed the relevancy approach an adequate standard
for civil cases, while rejecting it for criminal cases in favor of the more
rigid Frye rule.88 The reason for the variance is that an erroneous ver-
dict in a criminal trial may exact a greater social cost than in a civil case.
Thus, application of the more lenient relevancy approach may increase
the risk of admitting unreliable evidence into the decision making
process. 89
Under the relevancy test, the party opposing admissibility (nor-
mally the defendant in a criminal case) bears the burden of showing
unreliability, instead of the proponent (normally the prosecutor) carrying
a significant burden of proving the reliability of a novel scientific tech-
nique.90 Because scientific evidence often carries with it the "aura of
infallibility" and can be sufficient to sway the jury's verdict, the
increased burden for the accused is not acceptable to some.91
C. Substantial Acceptance
Many support relaxing the rigidness of the Frye rule and allowing
83. Id. § 203, at 874 (footnote omitted).
84. Id. § 203, at 875-76.
85. Id. § 203, at 876.
86. Id.
87. Id.






scientific evidence to be more readily admitted.9 2 Specifically, they sug-
gest that the general acceptance standard of Frye be replaced by a sub-
stantial acceptance test.93 The courts still would need to identify the
relevant scientific community and then determine whether the particular
technique had gained substantial acceptance by that community. "The
difference between the 'general acceptance test' and the 'substantial
acceptance test' is that while general acceptance implies acceptance by a
majority if not a significant majority of those experts in the particular
field, substantial acceptance clearly permits admissibility when accept-
ance is by a recognized minority segment." 94
The substantial acceptance standard was applied in United States v.
Torniero95 in determining that the defendant's compulsive gambling dis-
order was not relevant to his insanity defense. 96 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit recognized that because a professional
consensus on mental health issues is rare, even a majority acceptance
standard should not be required. 97 Instead, "[iun fashioning its prelimi-
nary decision on relevance, a court must make a discretionary determi-
nation that the hypotheses relied upon have substantial acceptance in the
discipline, as a basis for a finding that the disorder is relevant to the
insanity defense." '98
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reached a
similar conclusion in United States v. Gould.99 The court held that "the
proper test of foundational relevance is whether the general scientific
hypothesis of a putative causal relation between specific disorder and
specific conduct has substantial acceptance in the relevant
discipline."' 1°o
Modifying the Frye rule into the substantial acceptance test would
preserve the reliance on the scientific community's knowledge and opin-
ions in determining the value of the evidence but would allow a more
liberal approach to admissibility more in harmony with the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Minority positions could still be recognized and
considered and novel techniques would be accepted more quickly
because the courts would not have to wait for general acceptance to be
achieved. The substantial acceptance test would allow for a more uni-
92. MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, MODERN STATE AND FEDERAL EVIDENCE: A COMPREHENSIVE
REFERENCE TEXT 329 (1989); MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 203, at 873.
93. GRAHAM, supra note 92, at 329; MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 203, at 873.
94. GRAHAM, supra note 92, at 329.
95. 735 F.2d 725 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1110 (1985).
96. Id. at 732.
97. id. at 731.
98. Id. (footnote omitted).
99. 741 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1984).
100. Id. at 49.
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form approach to admissibility because the test could be applied to both
"hard" (forensic) science and "soft" (social) science, where general con-
sensus is more rare. The same test could also be used in criminal and
civil courts, eliminating any need for dual standards of admissibility.
D. Impact of Other Standards on Frye
The McCormick, Downing, and substantial acceptance tests have
all had an impact on Frye. McCormick has increased the focus on the
traditional notions of relevancy and the fact that they apply to novel
scientific evidence as they do to any evidence. 1 Downing provided for
the admissibility of novel scientific evidence with no established "track
record" if other indicia of reliability are present.' 0 2 Substantial accept-
ance has identified the fact that many scientific communities are unable
to reach consensus regarding the validity of certain principles but that
this should not exclude the entire profession's expertise from courts of
law. 103
Although each new test addressed a weakness of Frye, each created
other new problems of their own. Frye has likely endured because the
opinion of the scientific community is the most reliable indicator of a
scientific principle's validity."° After all, the reason for having expert
testimony is that certain areas are outside the body of knowledge pos-
sessed by lay persons and a qualified person must serve as educator.'
0 5
The experts, therefore, are the ones who are qualified to judge the infor-
mation's validity before it is presented to lay persons for their
consideration.
V. PROBLEM AREAS
A. Reliability of the Laboratory
Professor McCormick argued that, regardless of the standard of
admissibility applied to scientific evidence, significant attention must be
paid to arguments regarding the weight that scientific evidence should
be given.'06 The value of scientific evidence can be undermined by
many factors, including poor collection and analysis of data, introduc-
tion of subjective judgment in the scientific process, errors in cataloging
101. See supra notes 77-91 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 57-76 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
104. Those trained and knowledgeable in the specific area of expertise being testified to are the
people best qualified to judge the value of the testimony.
105. FED. R. EVID. 702.
106. MCCORMICK, supra note 7, § 203, at 876-77.
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and indexing information, and breaches in security of samples. 107
Errors in processing or interpreting results of scientific tests can be
devastating. In fact, cases have been noted where admitted fingerprint
evidence, which helped obtain murder convictions, was later found to be
false."10 Studies have revealed that the competency of many laborato-
ries is surprisingly low. °9
DNA evidence has been heralded by TIME magazine as "fool-
proof,""10 and, indeed, many courts have admitted DNA evidence."
But a commercial laboratory which analyzes DNA samples, Cellmark,
admitted making a false identification in a proficiency test and in
another instance Cellmark and Lifecodes (another commercial labora-
tory) came to different conclusions using the same DNA sample." 2
The reliability and acceptance level of scientific techniques are of
little significance if laboratories do not employ safeguards to offer some
assurance that their results are accurate. Rapid advancements in tech-
nology and the high cost of scientific equipment, combined with the
limited resources of law enforcement agencies, laboratories, and defend-
107. Id. § 203, at 877.
108. Imbler v. Craven, 298 F. Supp. 795, 909-10 (C.D. Cal.), aff'd, 424 F.2d 631 (9th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 865 (1970); see also State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 587 (Minn.
1982).
109. In 1978 the results of a Laboratory Proficiency Testing Program sponsored by the
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration were reported. Over 200 crime
laboratories participated in this program, which involved such common forensic
examinations as firearms, blood, drug, and trace evidence analyses. The Report
concluded: "A wide range of proficiency levels among the nation's laboratories
exists, with several evidence types posing serious difficulties for the
laboratories .. " Thus, although some laboratories performed exceptionally well,
the performance of others was disturbing: "65 percent of the laboratories had 80
percent or more of their results fall into the acceptable category. At the other end of
the spectrum, 3 percent of laboratories had less than 50 percent of their responses
considered acceptable."
Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Laboratory Reports in Criminal Trials: The Reliability of
Scientific Proof, 49 OHIo ST. L.J. 671, 688-89 (1988) [hereinafter Giannelli, Laboratory Reports]
(footnotes omitted). Seventy-one percent of the crime laboratories tested provided unacceptable
results in a blood test, 51.4% made errors in matching paint samples, 35.5% erred in a soil exami-
nation, and 28.2% made mistakes in firearms identifications. Similarly, a review of five handwrit-
ing comparison proficiency tests showed that the document examiners at best were correct 57% of
the time and were incorrect 43% of the time. Paul C. Giannelli, Criminal Discovery, Scientific
Evidence, and DNA, 44 VAND. L. REv. 791, 795 (1991) [hereinafter Giannelli, Criminal Discov-
ery] (footnotes omitted). Unacceptable proficiency was most often attributed to: (1) misinterpreta-
tion of test results due to carelessness or inexperience; (2) failure to employ adequate or
appropriate methodology; (3) mislabeling or contamination of primary standards; and (4) inade-
quate data bases or standard spectra. Giannelli, Laboratory Reports, supra at 688-89.
110. DNA Prints: A Foolproof Crime Test, TIME, Jan. 26, 1987, at 66.
111. Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988); see also People v. Castro, 545
N.Y.2d 985, 987 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
112. Giannelli, Criminal Discovery, supra note 109, at 796-97.
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ants and a lack of regulation of examiner qualifications, can only add to
the problem. The trier of fact should be informed that a laboratory's
procedures are an important consideration in judging the reliability of
the outcome of a scientific process because of the possibility of errone-
ous test results.
B. Application of Frye to "Soft" Science
Frye seems to work best when dealing with forensic scientific
information in a criminal court setting. Here, its conservative approach
is often beneficial to the criminal defendant by preventing the state from
admitting novel evidence alleged to link the defendant to the crime
charged.l' 3
Outside the criminal setting and forensic science application, Frye
loses some of its appeal. Areas of mental health and various social sci-
ences are less likely than forensic areas to reach the level of consensus
required to meet Frye's general acceptance requirement." 4 Because the
law should recognize the value of expertise in areas such as human
behavior and other "soft" sciences, a more relaxed standard such as sub-
stantial acceptance, which would provide for the admissibility of minor-
ity positions in the community, seems better suited to screen evidence of
this nature.
In Bird v. State,"5 a capital murder case, the Alabama Court of
Criminal Appeals held that the Frye rule was not applicable when a test
applied by an expert is in the nature of a physical comparison rather than
a scientific test or experiment. In Bird, a podiatrist sought to testify
regarding his theory of shoeprint identification based on a comparison of
shoe impressions found at the crime scene with shoes belonging to the
defendant." 6 The court shared the views of other jurisdictions when it
determined that general acceptance in the scientific community is not
required for testimony, such as shoeprint identification, which is neither
based on advanced technology nor sophisticated scientific methods that
are beyond the comprehension of the layperson.'
17
California state courts have distinguished between different types
of scientific evidence and applied different standards of admissibility to
them. In People v. McDonald,"8 the California Supreme Court held that
113. United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir. 1977); Giannelli, supra note 2, at
1246.
114. United States v. Torniera, 735 F.2d 725, 731 (2d Cir. 1984).
115. 594 So. 2d 644, 649 (Ala. Crim. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 594 So. 2d 676 (Ala.
1990).
116. Id. at 646-47.
117. Id. at 649-50 (citing State v. Hasan, 534 A.2d 877, 881 (Conn. 1987)).
118. 690 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1984).
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expert psychiatric opinion testimony and expert testimony regarding
generalized factual information is not subject to the Kelly-Frye rule. t t9
The court reasoned that the rigidity of the Kelly-Frye rule was not neces-
sary for testimony that could be considered the expert's personal opinion
because jurors are naturally more skeptical of an opinion than they are of
a scientific test or device, which carries with it the aura of infallibility."'2
Similarly, the Kelly-Frye rule is inapplicable where an expert merely
testifies to published factual information because this is not an expert
opinion that is beyond the common experience of the layperson. 12 t
In determining when the Kelly-Frye rule is to be applied, the Cali-
fornia courts distinguish between pure opinion testimony, as in McDon-
ald, and opinion testimony based on a psychological profile or
syndrome, as in People v. Bledsoe.lz2 The Kelly-Frye rule is not appli-
cable to pure opinion testimony, but it is applicable if the opinion is
based on a psychological profile or syndrome.
VI. PROGRESS SINCE FRYE
A. Andrews v. State
Andrews v. State'23 involved the question of the admissibility of
"genetic fingerprint" evidence. 24 In Andrews, the state admitted DNA
print identification evidence to link the defendant to a sexual battery.125
The test compared the defendant's DNA found in his blood with the
DNA found in a vaginal swab taken from the victim shortly after the
attack.' 2 6 A corporation specializing in this technology ran the test and
a doctor from the corporation testified to the results at trial. 27 The doc-
tor testified that the two samples matched and stated that the percentage
of the population that would have the DNA bands indicated by the sam-
119. Id. at 724. The California courts have referred to the Frye rule as the Kelly-Frye rule
since the decision in People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1976), where the California Supreme
Court applied the Frye rule to voiceprint evidence.
120. McDonald, 690 P.2d at 723-24.
121. Id. However, the California Supreme Court still stands by its decision in People v.
Bledsoe, 681 P.2d 291 (Cal. 1984), made six months prior to McDonald, where it held that the
lower court had erred in allowing the prosecution to admit opinion evidence that a rape victim was
suffering from rape trauma syndrome because it did not meet the Kelly-Frye rule.
122. 681 P.2d 291 (Cal. 1984); see Flanagan v. Florida, 586 So. 2d 1085, 1110 (Fla. 1st DCA
1991).
123. 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), reh'g denied, 542 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 1989).
124. The genetic fingerprint is a test in which strands of coding found in the genetic molecule
of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) from tissue or body fluid samples taken from a crime scene are
compared to the DNA molecules of the defendant for the purpose of identifying the defendant as
the perpetrator of the crime. Id. at 842.
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pies would be 0.0000012% or one in 839,914,540 people.128
Because Andrews was a case of first impression with regard to the
admissibility of DNA fingerprint results, the Fifth District Court of
Appeal of Florida analyzed the test as a new scientific technique. 129 The
court, however, was unsure regarding the standard for admissibility of
new scientific techniques. 130 The court reiterated the Frye rule that sci-
entific tests must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in their field. 31 But the court pointed out that although
many courts still apply the Frye rule, others have criticized it for being
too inflexible and inconsistent with modem evidence rules. 132 The court
cited as an example Chief Judge Ervin's commentary in Hawthorne v.
State,13 3 suggesting that Frye be rejected as a precondition to the admis-
sibility of evidence relating to novel scientific techniques.1'
3 4
The court eventually concluded that the relevancy approach
adopted in Downing should be applied.' 3 5 The court stated that Frye's
main flaw was that its application could result in the exclusion of relia-
ble evidence. 136  The relevancy approach was considered superior
because it recognizes that relevancy is the crucial factor in determining
the admissibility of any evidence and ensures "that only reliable scien-
tific evidence will be admitted."'
' 37
The Andrews court thought that the DNA results would be helpful
to the jury and that the expert witnesses were qualified in molecular
genetics. 38 The main issue the court addressed was the Rule 403 test:
whether the probative value substantially outweighed the potential preju-
dicial effect of admitting the evidence.' 39 The court then examined indi-
cia of reliability from Downing. The court found that DNA technology
had been used for a decade for various purposes in nonjudicial applica-
tions, much literature was published in the area, the technique had





132. Id. at 844.
133. 470 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
134. Andrews, 533 So. 2d at 844 (citing Hawthorne, 470 So. 2d at 783 (Ervin, C.J.,
concurring)).
135. Andrews, 533 So. 2d at 846-47.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 846.
138. Id. at 849. The court rejected the defendant's argument that the state's experts should not
testify because they were biased by the fact that their careers and reputations were dependent upon
the very DNA technology to which they were testifying. The court rejected this argument stating
that neither Frye nor the rules of evidence require expert witnesses to be impartial. Id. at 849 n.9.
139. Id. at 849.
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accepted statistical method of calculating probabilities, control samples
were also used, and the error rate appeared low. 4 ° These significant
indicia of reliability enabled the court to hold that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in allowing the DNA results admitted. 4'
B. Stokes v. State
In 1991, the Florida Supreme Court in Stokes v. State 42 compared
the Frye rule with other admissibility standards. The court concluded
that Frye is still the superior admissibility standard and applied the test
to exclude a witness's hypnotic and post-hypnotic statements. 43 The
court specifically criticized the Rule 403 balancing test as being too
flexible. By its nature, the Rule 403 balancing test would have to be
applied on a case-by-case basis entailing a lengthy, expensive, and time-
consuming process for the trial court every time admission was
sought.'" In addition, no guidelines were offered to apply the test
properly.'
45
VII. DA UBERT v. MERRELL Dow PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.
On June 28, 1993, the United States Supreme Court held in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ' that the Frye rule was
superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. In
Daubert, two children, along with their parents, sued Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. in California state court alleging that the chil-
dren's birth defects had been caused by their mothers' ingestion during
pregnancy of an anti-nausea drug called Bendectin which was marketed
by the defendant. 4 Merrell Dow removed the suits to Federal District
Court in Los Angeles on diversity grounds.'
48
Merrell Dow moved for summary judgment contending that
Bendectin does not cause birth defects in humans and that the plaintiffs
had no admissible evidence to prove that it does. Merrell Dow's motion
included an affidavit from Dr. Steven H. Lamm, a physician and epide-
miologist who is a respected expert on the risks associated with expo-
sure to various chemicals.' 49 Dr. Lamm conducted a review of all the
140. Id. at 849-50.
141. Id. at 850.
142. 548 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1989).
143. Id. at 195.
144. Id. at 194-95.
145. Id.
146. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
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literature on Bendectin and birth defects and concluded that maternal use
of Bendectin during the first trimester of pregnancy has not been shown
to increase the risk of human birth defects. Not one in the more than
thirty published studies involving more than 130,000 patients had found
Bendectin to be a human teratogen.
150
The plaintiffs responded to the motion with the testimony of eight
experts who had conducted their own tests and analysis and concluded
that Bendectin can cause birth defects. Their conclusions were based on
three areas of inquiry: 1) "in vitro" and "in vivo" animal studies that
found a link between Bendectin and malformations; 2) pharmacological
studies of the chemical structure of Bendectin, which purported to show
similarities between the structure of the drug and that of other sub-
stances known to cause birth defects; and 3) the "reanalysis" of previ-
ously published epidemiological studies.
51
The District Court granted Merrell Dow's motion for summary
judgment after refusing to admit the plaintiffs' evidence for failure to
meet the Frye rule of general acceptance in its field. 152 The Court held
that, given the quantity of epidemiological data regarding the effects of
Bendectin, evidence that is not based on epidemiology is not admissible
to show causation. 53 None of the plaintiffs' evidence was sufficient to
raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding causation and the
"reanalysis methodology" evidence was not admissible because it had
not been published or subjected to peer review.
54
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the lower court's ruling because the plaintiffs' evidence was not gener-
ally accepted in the relevant scientific community. 5 5 The Court of
Appeals stated that the unpublished reanalyses are "particularly prob-
lematic in light of the massive weight of the original published studies
supporting the defendant's position, all of which had undergone full
scrutiny from the scientific community."156
The plaintiffs appealed and the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari on October 13, 1992, "in light of sharp divisions
among the courts regarding the proper standard for the admission of
expert testimony."' 5 The Court heard arguments on March 30, 1993.
150. Id. A human teratogen is "a substance capable of causing malformations in fetuses." Id.
151. Id. at 2791-92.
152. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd,
951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
153. Id. at 575.
154. Id.
155. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1129-30 (9th Cir. 1991),
vacated, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
156. Id. at 1130.
157. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2792 (1993).
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The defendant argued that no conflict exists between Frye and the
Federal Rules of Evidence and that the two co-exist.1 58 Merrell Dow
pointed to Rule 104(a), which clearly delegates to the trial court the task
of deciding all preliminary admissibility questions regarding scientific
evidence and specifically states that the court is not bound by the rules
of evidence in making its determination.' 5 9 The defendant also stressed
that Rule 403 authorizes the exclusion of relevant evidence on the
grounds of unfair prejudice, confusion, or danger of misleading the
jury. 1 The Frye rule merely insists upon evidence meeting a threshold
of reliability before being admitted. 61 The Frye rule supplies "the ana-
lytical tools for evaluating proffered scientific evidence pursuant to the
mandate of Rules 104(a) and 403."162
The plaintiffs argued that the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence superseded Frye. They argued that Rule 402 "carries out Con-
gress's central goal of bringing uniformity and coherence to federal
evidence law." 163 Further, Frye could not have survived the enactment
of the evidence rules even if it had been universally accepted previously
because the courts should not be permitted to enact a "judicial amend-
ment to the Federal Rules of Evidence."' 64
The Court agreed with the plaintiffs' arguments calling Rule 402165
the "baseline" of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 6 6 The Court further
reasoned that the Rule's standard of relevancy is liberal because Rule
401 defines relevant evidence as evidence that has "any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determina-
tion of the action more probable or less probable than it would be with-
out the evidence."'
' 67
The Court cited its earlier decision in United States v. Abel. 68 In
158. Respondents' Brief in Opposition at 11, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,





163. Petition For Writ of Certiorari at 20, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113
S. Ct. 2786 (1993) (No. 92-102).
164. Id. at 22-23.
165. "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of
the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." FED. R.
EvID. 402.
166. The Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for
further proceedings. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court.
167. FED. R. EVID. 401; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2794
(1993).
168. 469 U.S. 45 (1984).
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Abel, the Court considered the role of the common law in interpreting
the Rules of Evidence and determined that the Rules occupy the field but
the common law could serve as an aid to their application. 69 In Abel,
however, the Court was considering a common law precept that was
consistent with the Rules. But in Daubert the Court was confronted
with Rule 702, which is not necessarily in harmony with the Frye rule
on the admissibility of expert testimony.1 70 The Court reasoned that
given the Rules' liberal approach to admissibility and the existence of a
specific rule on expert testimony that does not mention the general
acceptance standard, the defendant's argument that the Rules assimilated
Frye had to be rejected.' 7' The Court stated:
Nothing in the text of this Rule [702] establishes "general accept-
ance" as an absolute prerequisite to admissibility. Nor does [the
defendant] present any clear indication that Rule 702 or the Rules as
a whole were intended to incorporate a "general acceptance" stan-
dard. The drafting history makes no mention of Frye, and a rigid
"general acceptance" requirement would be at odds with the "liberal
thrust" of the Federal Rules and their "general approach of relaxing
the traditional barriers to 'opinion' testimony."'
' 7 2
The Court further stated that the Frye rule was incompatible with the
Federal Rules of Evidence and should not be applied in federal trials. 1
73
The Court then discussed the limitations on the admissibility of sci-
entific evidence and stated that trial judges are obligated, under Rule
702, to screen evidence to ensure that it is relevant and reliable. 74 The
Court reasoned that Rule 702's requirement that an expert's testimony
be based on scientific knowledge "clearly contemplates some degree of
regulation of the subjects and theories about which an expert may tes-
tify." 75 Because there are no absolute certainties in science, the subject
of scientific testimony need not be known to a certainty. But "in order
to qualify as 'scientific knowledge,' an inference or assertion must be
derived by the scientific method."'
' 76
Furthermore, the Court stated that Rule 702's "helpfulness" stan-
169. Id. at 51-52.
170. "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion
or otherwise." FED. R. EvID. 702.
171. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794.
172. Id. (citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).
173. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794.
174. Id. at 2795.
175. Id. "The adjective 'scientific' implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of





dard (that evidence must "assist the trier of fact"), "requires a valid sci-
entific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to
admissibility."' 77 This requirement was described in United States v.
Downing17 8 as having the proper "fit.' 1 79 The Court interpreted Rule
702 as a liberal standard giving an expert "wide latitude to offer opin-
ions, including those that are not based on first-hand knowledge or
observation."'' 80 It assumed that the "expert's opinion will have a relia-
ble basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline."' 81 The
Court stressed that a trial judge's inquiry should be flexible and focused
on the principles and methodology of the technique and not on the con-
clusions generated.'
8 2
In addition, the Court discussed the manner in which trial judges
are to determine the admissibility of scientific evidence:
Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, then, the trial
judge must first determine at the outset, pursuant to Rule 104(a),
whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge
that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in
issue. This entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning
or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of
whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the
facts in issue. We are confident that federal judges possess the
capacity to undertake this review.'
83
The Court identified some of the factors that a judge may consider in
making an admissibility determination, including the potential rate of
error, whether a theory or technique can and has been tested, and
whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication.' 84 Publi-
cation is not a requirement for admissibility because some new, innova-
tive theories and those of limited interest are often not published but
may still be admissible. "The fact of publication (or lack thereof) in a
peer-reviewed journal thus will be a relevant, though not dispositive,
consideration in assessing the scientific validity of a particular technique
or methodology on which an opinion is premised."' 85
In addition, the Court stated that the general acceptance of a theory
within its relevant scientific community can be considered in making an
admissibility determination. Citing Downing, the Court stated that
177. Id. at 2796.
178. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
179. Id. at 1226. See supra part IV.A.
180. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 2797.
183. Id. at 2796 (footnote omitted).
184. Id. at 2796-97.
185. Id. at 2797.
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"[w]idespread acceptance can be an important factor in ruling particular
evidence admissible, and 'a known technique that has been able to
attract only minimal support within the community' may properly be
viewed with skepticism."'
' 8 6
The Court also addressed some of the concerns regarding the aban-
donment of the Frye rule. Addressing the defendant's concern that
abandoning Frye would result in a "free-for-all" where ridiculous asser-
tions would be freely admitted and confuse juries, the Court stated that
the "traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible
evidence"8 7 are sufficient safeguards. 8 8  Furthermore, the Court
retained the power to grant summary judgment or direct a judgment
when necessary. "These conventional devices, rather than wholesale
exclusion under an uncompromising 'general acceptance' test, are the
appropriate safeguards where the basis of scientific testimony meets the
standards of Rule 702.'"I89
The opposite concern was expressed by the Daubert plaintiffs:
allowing a judge the discretion to screen evidence and exclude what she
considers to be invalid would result in a repressive scientific environ-
ment, hostile to innovation. 9 ' Addressing this concern, the Court
recognized
that in practice, a gatekeeping role for the judge, no matter how flexi-
ble, inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from learning of
authentic insights and innovations. That, nevertheless, is the balance
that is struck by Rules of Evidence designed not for exhaustive
search for cosmic understanding but for the particularized resolution
of legal disputes.' 9'
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stevens, concurred in
part and dissented in part. They concurred in the decision that Frye was
superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence but
opposed the Court making further "observations" regarding the Rules.
92
The Chief Justice and Justice Stevens believed that the observations
were vague and abstract and that the Court should "proceed with great
caution in deciding more than we have to."'1 9 3 The two Justices also
specifically disagreed with some of the majority's observations, includ-
ing the Court's conclusion that relevancy and reliability are the require-
186. Id. (citing United States v. Downing, 735 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985)).
187. Id. (i.e., cross-examination, introduction of contrary evidence, and careful jury instruction
regarding the burden of proof).
188. Id. at 2798.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 2798-99.




ments for the admissibility of expert testimony. Rule 402 does address
relevancy but does not make reference to reliability.19 4 Furthermore,
they pointed out that the Court's dicta creates numerous questions when
trial judges try to apply it to specific situations, especially when deter-
mining whether the dicta applies to technical and specialized knowledge
or just to scientific knowledge.19 While they acknowledged that Rule
702 gives judges some gatekeeping responsibilities, they worried that
requiring judges to make determinations regarding the scientific validity
of the reasoning or methodology underlying proposed testimony inap-
propriately and unnecessarily turns them into "amateur scientists."
' 196
In overruling Frye, the Daubert decision may have created more
problems that it has solved. Although the holding clearly states that
meeting the Frye rule is no longer a prerequisite for the admission of
scientific evidence, trial judges may still consider the acceptance level of
a scientific technique within its professional community. Furthermore, a
court must view with skepticism those techniques enjoying only mini-
mal support. Therefore, the Frye rule can be, and likely will continue to
be, given strong consideration by many trial courts. It is more practical
for a judge, untrained in the scientific field, to rely on the opinions of
experts than to make an independent determination of the scientific
validity of "the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony" and
"whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the
facts in issue."' 19 7 Although the Court expressed confidence in federal
judges' capacity to undertake this task successfully, the trial courts' fail-
ure to effectively and consistently complete this task created the need for
the Court's review in the first place. The Court has done little in
Daubert to provide trial judges with the needed guidance to resolve this
special admissibility problem.
Despite the Court's expressed intent to harmonize the admissibility
standard with the liberal thrust of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
whether courts will now be more receptive to minority positions than
they would be with a substantial acceptance standard is unclear. The
Court's observation that positions with minimal support in the relevant
scientific community "may properly be viewed with skepticism" seems
to indicate continued rejection of unpopular techniques.
198
The holding in Daubert is very similar to that of United States v.
Downing, 199 because both allow the Frye general acceptance standard to
194. Id. at 2800.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 2796.
198. Id. at 2797.
199. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
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be considered as one factor in the judge's admissibility decision. 2" In
addition, both suggest as other indicia of reliability the ability of a tech-
nique to be tested or used in other applications and peer review and
publication of specialized literature.20 1 Both decisions view the reliabil-
ity of a particular scientific technique to be key to its admissibility,
despite the fact that the applicable Federal Rules of Evidence do not
address reliability.2" 2 Further, neither court provides a method for trial
judges to make such a determination.
Daubert has not resolved the dispute regarding the proper method
of determining the admissibility of scientific evidence. In fact, Daubert
may actually serve to intensify the debate because of the loss of a dis-
positive standard like the Frye rule.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The impact of Frye v. United States has been significant. Since the
case was decided seventy years ago, Frye's general acceptance test has
been the dominant standard for determining the admissibility of novel
scientific evidence. Although no longer dispositive, the Frye rule will
still be considered and relied upon heavily by many courts even after the
Daubert decision. Daubert, however, will now allow some evidence to
be admissible where previously its failure to meet the general acceptance
standard would have been dispositive.
Critics of Frye who argued that a more relaxed standard is required
in all cases to avoid the exclusion of relevant evidence should be content
with the Daubert decision because the degree of consensus in the scien-
tific community (or lack thereof) is no longer dispositive. Genuine inno-
vations in science are likely to be accepted more quickly because a court
will not have to wait for widespread acceptance in the community before
allowing a technique or testimony to be admissible.
Those who argued that courts were admitting too much "junk sci-
ence" will no longer have the Frye rule to rely on as a screening thresh-
old. They may, however be comforted by the requirement that factors
other than general acceptance will have to be considered to justify the
admission of purported "scientific" evidence.
The courts and the Federal Rules of Evidence still have not ade-
quately addressed the lack of competency and accuracy that exists in
many commercial and public laboratories that process and analyze sci-
entific evidence. A determination of the proper admissibility standard is
a moot endeavor if the evidence itself is suspect because of faulty proce-
200. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797; Downing, 753 F.2d at 1237-38.
201. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796-97; Downing, 753 F.2d at 1238-39.
202. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2799; Downing, 753 F.2d at 1238-39.
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dures. Therefore, validity of the procedures employed by the laboratory
(including security of samples, re-testing, and use of control samples)
should be a threshold question that must be satisfactorily answered
before scientific evidence is admitted. The margin for error in the scien-
tific process has not yet been acknowledged by the courts.
Future cases will likely test the bounds of the trial court's discretion
in the admissibility of scientific evidence. If wide disparities continue to
occur among courts, the United States Supreme Court will find itself
revisiting the admissibility issue once again.
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